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Abstract
This paper considers how electoral competition affects voters’ turnout and
candidate choice. We do so via an instrumental-variable (IV) bivariate pro-
bit with selection which jointly estimates both processes. Our analysis con-
trols for individual and election characteristics, campaigning, and election
day weather. We focus on the effects of negative advertising (tone) and
overall spending (intensity) on several aspects of voter behavior, including
abstentions. Our findings: tone increases turnout of Independents only, and
can strengthen partisanship among non-voters. Campaign intensity matters
more than tone. Overall, there is evidence that Democrats, Independents
and Republicans have different propensities to react to campaigning, which
do not follow a straightforward pattern. We also show that failure to con-
sider turnout in voter choices leads to erroneous conclusions.
“The act of voting requires the citizen to make not a single choice
but two. He must choose between rival parties or candidates. He
must also decide whether to vote at all.” (Campbell et al., 1960,
page 89.)
“Partisanship is the single most important influence on political
opinions and voting behavior.” (Flanigan and Zingale, 1998, page
53.)
1 Introduction
During elections, citizens take two related choices: whether to vote or not,
and if so for whom. Given information on voter preferences (e.g. polling),
candidates may employ different stratagems to win votes. They may choose
campaign themes that enfranchise the base, swing the undecided, or dis-
enchant the opponent’s supporters. As a result, tactics politicians employ
may have effects on turnout and candidate choice that vary across groups of
voters. Our goal is to investigate the extent to which this is true. Our inter-
est is in understanding which voters are more likely to respond to political
campaigning by either candidate, and how they respond (e.g. whether they
are enfranchised, swung, or disenchanted).
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To do so we need to allow potential correlation between turnout and
candidate choice. To this end, we empirically model the voter’s decision as
a two-stage process: (i) turnout, and (ii) choice of the candidate. We per-
form an instrumental variable (IV) bivariate probit with sample selection
on voter choices, taking into account demographics, election and candidate
characteristics, campaigning, and weather variations. We focus on two indi-
cators of campaign tactics and intensity: tone (percent negative statements
by each candidate. 1) and campaign spending.
An IV bivariate probit is appealing for two reasons: first we can empir-
ically estimate and test the correlation coefficient. If it is not zero, turnout
is correlated with voter choice, and its omission gives rise to selection bias.
Second, it is possible to look at the effect of various covariates on condi-
tional outcomes (e.g. the percentage who voted Democrat conditional upon
turnout) and on counterfactual outcomes (e.g. the percentage who would
have voted Democrat but stayed home on election day). This affords us a
richer understanding of candidates’ campaigns and voters’ responses. Hence
we consider this preferable to related approaches such as a multinomial pro-
bit or logit. 2
We tackle two additional issues. First, candidates’ tone and spending
are potentially endogenous variables. We employ instrumental variables to
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address this. Second, we determine the extent of selection bias by comparing
our findings against a probit on voters’ choice of candidate.
Our analysis is based upon calculating the distribution of marginal effects
on each voter. 3 We find that:
1. Turnout and candidate choice are indeed correlated. Unobservable
shocks that raise the turnout of a partisan voter also swing her in favor
of the opposing candidate. This has two interpretations: news (scan-
dals) that causes the voter to switch sides, or more subtly, non-voters
optimally choosing abstention over the opposing party’s candidate.
2. Generally, negative campaigning does not appear to be more effective
than positive campaigning.
3. Tone increases the turnout of Independents only;
4. Tone does not swing voters towards any candidate, but can strengthen
partisanship among non-voters.
5. Independents are the most responsive to campaigning, Republicans
are the least.
6. Our results differ significantly from a probit of voter’s choice of can-
didate, indicating that selection is an important issue.
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This paper merges together two branches of literature that deal with the
effect of tone on: (i) turnout 4 and (ii) voters’ selection of candidates. 5
Our paper develops on these works in the following methodological and sub-
stantive respects: (i) the literature has tended to treat these two questions
separately, and to our knowledge, ours is the first attempt at a joint estima-
tion; 6 (ii) we also differ in that we use candidate tone and not aggregate
tone. Whereas previous work implicitly takes the view that voters value the
overall conduct of the campaign, in this paper we assume that voters are
primarily interested in individual candidates’ actions.
Recent decades have seen an increase in negative campaigning and de-
crease in voter turnout. This has raised concerns that negative campaigning
might be a key contributor to an increasingly disenchanted electorate. Our
results do not support this demobilizing view. Partisans are more likely to
use abstention as a signal of dissatisfaction with their party’s candidate,
rather than as a response to “dirty politics.” Contrary to previous work,
we find that Independents may be mobilized by negative campaining. Our
findings also show that overall, negative campaigning is not more effective
at winning votes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes
the various sources of data, section 3 introduces the econometric model,
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while section 4 contains our results. Section 5 compares the bivariate probit
with a simple probit on citizens’ choice of candidate. Last, section 6 offers
some concluding remarks.
2 The data
We merge data from several different sources providing information on
voters, candidates and weather conditions.
The data on voter characteristics comes from The American National
Election Studies (2005) Cumulative Data Fle (ANES-CDF). We selected
covariates reflecting individual voters’ demographic characteristics and party
affiliations, as well as their choices about turnout and the candidates, for
the time period ranging from 1988 to 1998.
Our selected candidates’ characteristics include campaign tone, projec-
tions of the competitiveness of the race, candidates’ incumbency status, and
campaign spending. Measures of campaign tone are from Franklin (1991)
(for the period 1988-1990) and Lau and Pomper (2004) (for the period 1992-
1998). These data account for the statements that either the candidate
or his 7 spokesperson made during the last eight weeks of the campaign,
as reported in the largest newspapers in the state where the election was
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held (Franklin (1991)) or in all articles sampled from the online databases
Nexis/Lexis and Dow Jones (Lau and Pomper (2004)). These statements
were coded as either positive (about the candidate) or negative (about the
opponent). For each candidate, tone is defined as the percentage of nega-
tive statements made. From Lau and Pomper (2004) we also gathered the
Congressional Quarterly Spring and Fall projections about each race. In-
formation about incumbency was gathered from Moore et al. (2001), while
those about candidate spending were collected from the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC) web-site. 8
To address the effect of election day weather conditions on voter turnout,
we use data from the US National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). 9 We ob-
tained daily summary measures of precipitation, snow and maximum/minimum
temperature at some 20,000 stations across the US on election day in each of
the election years from 1988 to 1998. We also constructed moving averages
(and hence election-day deviations from them) of each weather measure by
averaging over the first 10 days of November, over the twenty preceding
years. 10 In this way we capture large deviations of weather indicators from
their norms, as we expect that extraordinary weather conditions may have
caused changes in turnout decisions.
Since weather data is more meaningful with small geographical units, we
6
merged weather information with voter and race characteristics according
to the county, which is the smallest geographical unit available in the ANES
CDF. However this information was available only for the period 1988 to
1998, thus determining our sample period. 11
Table 1 reports summary voter and candidate statistics that are used in
the estimation.
[Table 1 about here.]
Voter characteristics include demographics such as age, gender, race,
religious attendance, house ownership, marital status, urban location, edu-
cation and occupation. With the exception of age, all are dummy variables
which equal 1 if the condition implied by the variable name is satisfied. For
example, “Religious” equals 1 if voters attend religious services weekly or
almost weekly.
Reported average turnout is about 68 percent, which is well above the
average turnout rates that are observed. This is in large part due to the well-
known problem of turnout inflation in self-reported surveys. Nonetheless,
these surveys provide the most useful source of micro-level data. Opinion on
turnout misreporting is divided. Sigelman (1982) shows that misreporting
may not seriously affect estimates of the turnout decisions, but Palfrey and
Poole (1987) are more cautious, and show that candidates choices condi-
7
tional on turnout can be fairly well estimated, whereas problems may arise
when looking at turnout only. Unfortunately, our sample offers little in-
formation about vote validation (only validating turnout in the years 1988
and 1990). 12 Observe also that in spite of turnout misreporting, Democrat
share of the vote in the survey is 53 percent, which is not too far from the
actual figure (about 49 percent).
The second panel of table 1 depicts voters’ party affiliation as from the
seven-point scale from the ANES. Dem3 (Rep3), Dem2 (Rep2) and Dem1
(Rep1) are respectively “strong Democrat (Republican),” “weak Democrat
(Republican)” and “Independent leaning to Democrat (Republican).” The
omitted category consists of Independents. About 50 percent of the sample
identifies themselves as Democrats, while 40 percent identify themselves as
Republican. Independents are around 10 percent.
Finally, the bottom panel reports summary statistics of candidates’ char-
acteristics. For each candidate, we show the number of terms as an incum-
bent, where zero stands for challenger. The variables labeled “Fall/Spring
Favored Candidate” are dummy variables indicating whether the candidate
polled higher in those polls, and are obtained by converting the seven-point
scale of the Fall and Spring Congressional Quarterly assessment of the close-
ness of the race into a three-point scale. Total disbursements are campaign
8
disbursements reported to the Federal Elections Commission. Tone is frac-
tion of one candidate’s statements about the opponent over all his state-
ments.
Table 2 reports weather averages over some 2500 counties in the USA
for which the weather data was available.
[Table 2 about here.]
We consider three weather measures: precipitation, snowfall, and minimum
temperature of the day. 13 Looking at the right panel, mean and standard
deviation of our weather measures during the first 10 days of November are
fairly constant. The left panel provides an idea of weather variation across
the US on election day. As we can see, 1990, 1992 and 1998 appear to have
particularly large variances (and means) in precipitation, 1990 and 1992 for
snowfall.
3 The Empirical Method
In this section we present the bivariate probit model with selection. Let
di1 be a binary variable such that di1 = 1 if individual i voted, and di2 = 1 if
she voted Democrat, and zero if she voted Republican. Define the indicator
9
function 1[A] = 1 if A holds and 0 otherwise. The empirical model is as
follows:
Turnout : d∗i1 = w
′
i1α1 + εi1, di1 = 1[d
∗
i1 > 0], (1)
Dem or Rep : d∗i2 = w
′
i2α2 + εi2, di2 = 1[d
∗
i2 ≥ 0],
where the regressors wi1 and wi2 need not be identical. The data observed
is the vector
(di1, di1di2, w′i2, w
′
i2)
′, i = 1, ..., N, iid.
Censoring occurs because di2 is observed only when di1 = 1. We will often
omit the subscript i in the following. Let ε ≡ (ε1, ε2)′ denote the matrix of
error terms. The conventional assumption is made:
Normality of error : ε ∼ N (0,Ω) , Ω ≡
 1 ρ
ρ 1
 , independently of w,
We will estimate the parameters (α′1, α′2, ρ)′ with MLE using turnout and
voting outcomes (di1, di1di2), along with the other covariates. This selection
problem is similar to that found in Van De Ven and Van Praag (1981),
Boyes et al. (1989), and Dubin and Rivers (1989). Meng and Schmidt
(1985) also discuss MLE under this and other types of censoring in bivariate
probit models.
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3.1 Likelihood Function
Define ψ(ε1, ε2, ρ) as the standard bivariate normal density function with
correlation ρ, and let
Ψ (ε1, ε2, ρ) ≡
∫ ε2
−∞
∫ ε1
−∞
ψ(t1, t2, ρ)dt1dt2.
denote the standard bivariate normal distribution. The log-likelihood func-
tion (``h) is maximized over the parameters (α1, α2, ρ) and consists of three
terms corresponding to the three cases: di1 = 0, (di1 = 1, di2 = 0), and
(di1 = 1, di2 = 1). Specifically, letting Φ(·) denote the c.d.f. of a standard
normal distribution, we have that
``h =
N∑
i=1
(1− di1) · lnΦ
(−w′i1α1) (2)
+di1 (1− di2) · lnP
(−w′i1α1 < εi1, εi2 < −w′i2α2)
+di1di2 · lnP
(−w′i1α1 < εi1, εi2 > −w′i2α2) .
The first term represents the likelihood contribution of not voting, the sec-
ond term represents the likelihood contribution of an individual voting Re-
publican, and the third term represents the likelihood contribution of an
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individual voting Democrat. Let
p1 = Φ
(−w′1α1) = Pr (didn’t vote)
p2 = Φ
(−w′2α2) = Pr (voted R or would have voted R if turned out.)
p3 = Ψ
(−w′1α1,−w′2α2, ρ) = Pr (didn’t vote and would have voted R if turned out)
Then the probability of voting Republican is
P
(−w′1α1 < ε1, ε2 < −w′2α2) = P (ε2 < −w′2α2)− P (ε1 < −w′1α1, ε2 < −w′2α2)
= p2 − p3;
and the probability of voting Democrat is
P
(−w′1α1 < ε1, ε2 > −w′2α2) = 1− P (ε1 < −w′1α1)− P (−w′1α1 < ε1, ε2 < −w′2α2)
= 1− p1 − (p2 − p3) .
3.2 Predicting Turnout and Voter Choice
Let Ψjk (w′1α1, w′2α2, ρ) denote the probability associated with the turnout
choice j and candidate choice k. Thus for example, Ψ11(·) is the probability
of the event “voted Democrat.” Suppressing arguments, the values of these
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probabilities are given by:
Ψ00 = Pr (d1 = 0, d2 = 0) = p3
Ψ01 = Pr (d1 = 0, d2 = 1) = p1 − p3
Ψ10 = Pr (d1 = 1, d2 = 0) = p2 − p3;
Ψ11 = Pr (d1 = 1, d2 = 1) = 1− p1 − (p2 − p3) .
Ultimately, candidates are interested in winning elections. We measure the
Democrat share of the vote by the conditional probability
Pr (d2 = 1|d1 = 1) = Pr (d1 = 1, d2 = 1)Pr (d1 = 1) =
Ψ11
1− p1 .
An interesting counterfactual that we examine is the candidate choice among
non-voters. The proportion of non-voters who would have voted Democrat
is
Pr (d2 = 1|d1 = 0) = Pr (d1 = 0, d2 = 1)Pr (d1 = 0) =
Ψ01
p1
.
3.3 Marginal Effects of Tone
We calculate the effect of negative campaigning on three events of interest:
probability of turnout; probability of voting Democrat conditional on turn-
ing out; and probability of voting Democrat, conditional upon abstention.
Let α1tl and α2tl be the coefficients of tone in equation (1), l ∈ {d, r}. The
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corresponding value of tone is td or tr. Then
∂Ψjk
∂tl
= ψjk,1α1 + ψjk,2α2
where ψjk,1 and ψjk,2 are the derivatives of Ψjk w.r.t. the 1st and 2nd
arguments respectively.
The marginal effect of any variable w1 on p1 is
∂p1
∂w1
= −φ (·)α1;
and the marginal effect of w2 on p2 is
∂p2
∂w2
= −φ (·)α2;
and the marginal effect of a particular wi on p3 (if it appears in both equa-
tions) is
∂p3
∂wi
= −ψ (·, ·) (α1 + α2) .
Therefore the marginal effect of tone on voting Democrat (conditional
on turning out) is
∂
(
Ψ11
1−p1
)
∂tl
= −
(1− p1)
(
∂p2
∂tl
− ∂p3∂tl
)
+ (p2 − p3) ∂p1∂tl
(1− p1)2
(3)
=
(1− p1) [φ (·)α2 − ψ (·, ·) (α1 + α2)] + (p2 − p3)φ (·)α1
(1− p1)2
.
Similarly, the marginal effect of tone on the probability of voting Democrat
14
among those who stayed home on election day is
∂
(
Ψ01
p1
)
∂tl
= −p1
∂p3
∂tl
− p3 ∂p1∂tl
p21
=
p1ψ (·, ·) (α1 + α2)− p3φ (·)α1
p21
.
4 Estimation
Before we report the results of our analysis, we discuss the IV procedure.
4.1 First Stage
Our measures of tone, td and tr, and of campaign spending sd and sr, are
potentially endogenous. Candidates may adjust their campaign strategies
according to new information (news, polling data), and not taking this be-
havior into account may introduce biases which have unclear signs. If, for
instance, a candidate behind in the polls is more likely to attack his op-
ponent (perhaps if negative campaigning is more effective than its positive
counterpart), this would bias coefficients downwards. If positive campaign-
ing were more effective, the opposite would result. A similar problem arises
with campaign spending: a weak incumbent is more likely to be matched
with a strong and well-financed challenger, so that the impact of campaign
spending on the probability of winning for the challenger will be overesti-
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mated. A strong incumbent is more likely to face weak competition, and
therefore may need less resources for campaigning. As a result, the impact
of campaign spending on the incumbent’s probability of winning may be
underestimated.
There are two ways to address the endogeneity problem: via either a full-
information or a limited-information maximum likelihood (FIML/LIML) ap-
proach. A FIML approach involves simulating from a multivariate normal
distribution of order 6, which is numerically intensive and can be unsta-
ble. Therefore we opt for the more feasible two-stage LIML approach. In
this case, the standard errors need to be computed according to an alter-
native procedure. The first stage is to estimate the following by seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR).
td = Xβtd + utd (4)
tr = Xβtr + utr (5)
sd = Xβsd + usd (6)
sr = Xβsr + usr (7)
where (utd , utr , usd , usr) follows N (0,Σ). In this stage, suitable instruments
would be variables that affect candidate strategy but not voter behavior. For
spending, we mainly follow Gerber (1998) and Lau and Pomper (2004) by
16
including spring favored candidate, the log of voting age population in each
state, the logs of candidates’ starting campaign funds, and total spending
in the last Senate race. 14 As for tone, using lagged tone would cost too
many observations. Hence we follow an alternative approach: as tone may
be linked to the amount raised in the election, we consider a dummy for the
richer candidate, and the log of total spending by the same party’s candidate
in the previous two Senate elections (thus one race will be for the same seat).
Unlike Lau and Pomper (2004) we do not include dummies for pollsters and
campaign consultants as these choices are potentially endogenous to the type
of campaign the candidate wants to run. Lastly, we include as controls the
number of terms served by each candidate, and dummy variables for the
year and state. Table 3 shows the results of this stage.
[Table 3 about here.]
The SUR achieves fairly high R-squared values: around 0.5 for the tone
equations, and above 0.68 for the spending equations. Lagged spending in
the two previous Senate races does a good job at predicting current spending,
while Spring polling does a good job at predicting tone. Even in the weakest
equation, Republican tone, we have at least two instruments significantly
different from zero. The estimated correlation coefficient corr(td, tr) = 0.303
coincides with previous findings that candidates tend to respond to attacks
17
with other attacks (Lau and Pomper (2001b)).
4.2 Second Stage
In the second stage we estimate the bivariate probit via MLE of equa-
tion (2) using the fitted measures of tone and spending obtained in the
first stage. This will yield consistent estimates of α1 and α2.15 Let β =
(βtd , βtr , βsd , βsr), θ = (α
′
1, α
′
2, ρ)
′ and Z = X ∪ w1 ∪ w2. Following Newey
(1984), we can write the two stage estimation as an M-estimation such that
g(Xi, β) ≡ ui ⊗Xi = (ti − β′Xi)⊗Xi, E [g(Xi, β)] = 0
h(Zi, β, θ) ≡ ∂``hi(β, θ)
∂θ
, E[(Zi, β, θ)] = 0
The estimated asymptotic covariance matrix is given by the following for-
mula
AVAR(θ̂) = H−1θ VhhH
−1′
θ +H
−1
θ Hβ
[
G−1β VggG
−1′
β
]
H ′βH
−1′
θ
−H−1θ
[
HβG
−1
β Vgh + VhgG
−1′
β H
′
β
]
H−1′θ
where Hθ = 1n
n∑
i=1
∂h(Zi,βˆ,θˆ)
∂θ′ , Hβ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂h(Zi,βˆ,θˆ)
∂vec(β′)′ , Gβ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂g(Xi,bβ)
∂vec(β′)′ ,
Vgg = 1n
n∑
i=1
g(Xi, β̂)g(Xi, β̂)′, Vgh = 1n
∑n
i=1 g(Xi, β̂)h(Zi, β̂, θ̂)
′, Vhg = V ′gh,
and Vhh = 1n
∑n
i=1 h(Zi, βˆ, θˆ)∂h(Zi, βˆ, θˆ)
′. All of these can be evaluated
analytically or numerically. 16
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The second stage comprises two equations. The following covariates
are common to both of them: voters’ demographics such as age (and its
square), gender, education, dummies for white voters, religious attendance,
home ownership, marriage, urban residency status, unemployment, retire-
ment, homemaker, students, the seven-point scale party identification, year
dummies, and the fitted values of our endogenous variables tone (and its
square) and campaign spending. The turnout equation additionally includes
election day weather deviations from its historical mean, dummies for elec-
tions with an incumbent and Fall favored candidate. The voting equation
also includes dummies for the Democrat and the Republican incumbents,
and dummies for Democrat and Republican favored candidates in the Fall
polls. Table 4 reports the estimates of the IV bivariate probit.
[Table 4 about here.]
Refer to the columns labeled “full sample.” Most of the variables have
a significant effect on turnout, whereas voters’ choice of candidates is most
affected by party affiliation, campaign tone and spending. As to be expected,
stronger party affiliation is associated with higher turnout and higher like-
lihood of voting along party lines. Democrat tone has a convex effect, while
Republican tone has a concave effect.
Since party affiliation has a strong effect on voter turnout and candidate
19
choice, and the estimated correlation coefficient between turnout and voting
Democrat is not significantly different from zero, we may suspect that the
estimate of the correlation coefficient reflects the aggregate behavior of two
groups of opposing voters. This leads us to replicate our estimation by
splitting our sample into three groups, according to the three-point scale
party identification variable from ANES: Democrats (consisting of voters
self-identified as dem3 and dem2 ), Republicans (consisting of voters rep3
and rep2 ), and Independents (consisting of dem1, rep1 and the excluded
category, ind). In doing so we obtain roughly balanced sample sizes. The
results are still reported in table 4, and labeled “Democrat”, “Independent”
and “Republican” respectively. The estimates suggest that tone does not
affect turnout but has differential effects on candidate choice. In particular,
Republican tone affects Democrat voters’ candidate choice, Democrat tone
affects Independent voters’ candidate choice, and Republican voters appear
to be unresponsive to negative campaigning by either party. Likewise, there
is some evidence that Republican spending reduces the Democrat share of
the vote.
Finally observe that ρ is different across the three samples. In the Demo-
crat and Republican samples they are opposite in sign and significantly
different from zero while for Independents it is close to zero. A value of
20
-0.65 for Democrats and 0.78 for Republicans implies that any unobserved
factors that make partisans turn out also induce them to vote across party
lines. We can interpret this as news, possibly scandals about one candi-
date, which cause partisans to vote for the opposing candidate. There is
another more subtle interpretation, illustrated in figure 1. The four quad-
rants on the x − y plane represent four voter actions as indicated. Voters
A, B, (Democrat) C and D (Republican) are hypothetical non-voters. The
arrows pointing south-east (north-east) represent the direction of shocks 
to Democrats (Republicans). It is possible that a partisan has rationally
chosen abstention. However a large enough shock to  that induces her
turnout, can result in her voting for the opposite candidate, as in the case of
B and C. This suggests that abstention is used by partisans to signal their
dissatisfaction with their own candidates.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Since the bivariate probit is a nonlinear model, care should be taken in in-
terpreting these estimates. In particular, they do not reflect marginal effects
of covariates. Since different voters will have different marginal effects, we
find it is more useful to provide an idea of the distribution of the marginal
effects. We do so by evaluating them for every voter in the sample, and then
reporting the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles. 17
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We thus turn to the analysis of marginal effects of several covariates
of interest, focusing on the three voting outcomes, turnout, probability of
voting Democrat conditional on turnout, and probability that a voter would
have voted Democrat, conditional on abstention. These results are in tables
5, 6 and 7.
[Table 5 about here.]
Referring to table 5, we see that turnout among whites, males and religious
voters is higher, with the exception of the Democrat sample, where the
effects are the opposite of Independents and Republicans. Voters whose
party identification is strongest are much more likely to turn out. These
results are in line with previous findings on turnout.
Moving to our variables of interest, we see that Democrat and Republican
tone generate inconclusive results (since the 20-80 quantile range contains
zero in all samples) for partisan voters. However increases in tone raises
Independents’ propensity to vote. Spending by Democrat candidates in-
creases Democrat turnout, but decreases Independent turnout. Spending
by Republican candidates reduce both Democrat and Independent turnout.
Overall Republicans seem to be the least responsive to campaigning. In-
dependents are the most responsive. In particular, Independents are more
likely to stay home when the intensity of the campaign (as measured by
22
spending) increases. We interpret this fact as evidence that contested races
(which tend to have higher campaign intensity) generate a convergence to-
wards the median, which in turn can induce some Independents to rationally
abstain.
Interestingly, different from much of the literature, our findings support
a limited mobilizing hypothesis. The composition of the campaign matters
for Independent turnout. Negative campaigning can mobilize Independents,
although its effect on partisans is not clear.
We now turn to table 6 which reports the marginal effects on individuals’
likelihood of voting Democrat conditional on turning out. Voters who are
more strongly affiliated to their party are more likely to vote for their own
candidate. White, male and religious Independent voters are less likely to
vote Democrat.
[Table 6 about here.]
Turning to the variables of interest, we see again that tone generates in-
conclusive results on each category of voters, whereas spending affects the
conditional probability of voting for the Democrat candidate. However even
though the effect of tone is most dispersed among Independent voters, the
Democrat candidate’s tone is more apt to decrease his share of votes among
Independent voters.
23
Moreover, spending by both candidates increases the probability of a
favorable vote from the Independents, whereas the effect on partisans is
different. Whenever either candidate increases his spending, Republican
voters tend to vote for him, whereas Democrat voters tend to vote against
him. If we look the effect of additional spending on partisans, the votes
gained from one candidate’s spending, roughly equals the votes lost by the
opponent’s spending. There are two related findings here. Firstly, the battle-
ground is over Independent voters. Campaign intensity wins them over. We
interpret this as further evidence that candidates are campaigning towards
the median. Secondly, while campaign intensity matters for Independents,
its composition does not. Whereas tone was important in mobilizing In-
dependent turnout, here it does not prove to be more effective in swaying
Independents towards any candidate.
Finally we consider in table 7 the marginal effects on the probability
that a non-voter supported the Democrat candidate.18
[Table 7 about here.]
Here we are concerned with understanding which candidate would be more
disadvantaged by abstentions when he increases campaign tone and inten-
sity. The effects of Republican tone are inconclusive, and Independents who
stay home are not responsive to either candidate’s tone. It is interesting to
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observe the effect of tone by the Democrat candidate. It increases the prob-
ability of getting a favorable vote by Democrat non-voters and a negative
vote by Republican non-voters. Put another way, Democrat tone increases
the share Democrat supporters among Democrat non-voters, and decreases
the the share of Democrat supporters among Republican non-voters. Thus
it appears that Democrat tone has a polarizing effect among abstentions.
The effects of campaign spending are clearer. As each candidate’s cam-
paign intensity increases, the probability of getting a favorable vote among
those who stayed home increases.
In sum, our findings are in line with previous findings about turnout. But
additionally, we find that overall, the intensity of the campaign (spending)
matters more than the composition of the campaign (tone). To a large extent
voters are willing to receive messages where the opponent is criticized or even
accused, as much as messages where one candidate promotes himself.
Tone appears to have its greatest effect on the turnout of Independent
voters. However, its influence on voters’ choice is less clear. Spending leads
to lower turnout by Independent voters. We also find that citizens prefer to
stay home on election day rather than to vote for the opponent’s candidate.
Hence, abstention seems to be more of a sign of voters’ unhappiness with
their own candidate than their disenchantment with the political system.
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Overall, Republican voters seem to be less responsive to campaigning,
although the data does not give indications as to why this is so.
5 Probit Without Selection
Since the correlation coefficient ρ for the Democrat, Republican and
Independent samples are different from each other, we may expect there to
be some selection bias resulting from ignoring turnout. To investigate the
extent of this bias, we compare our findings from the IV bivariate probit with
those obtained from an IV probit regression on votedem alone. We continue
to focus on marginal effects, and on the three sub-samples “Democrat”,
“Independent” and “Republican.” Table 8 displays the marginal effects
from the two estimation methods.19
[Table 8 about here.]
Consider Democrat tone first. Although we cannot be conclusive about the
sign of the effects, in the case of the IV bivariate probit, the distribution of
the effects of Democrat tone consistently lies to the left of the distribution
implied by the IV probit. In other words, the IV probit overestimates the
effect of Democrat tone on the Democrat share of the vote. This is because
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the IV probit does not consider that there are some voters who chose to ab-
stain instead of voting for the opposing candidate. Some of these candidates
may be induced to switch sides as a response to increased tone.
The IV probit also implies that higher Republican tone increases votes
for the Democrat candidate among Independents, but decreases votes for
the Democrat candidate among Republican voters. The IV bivariate probit
is not conclusive.
The evidence on the effects of campaign spending is stronger. In all
three samples, the two methods yield opposite findings. According to the IV
probit, increased spending by the Democrat candidate raises his votes among
Democrat voters, but decreases his votes among Independent (the largest
effect) and Republican voters (the effect of Republican spending on voters is
similar, but of opposite sign). The predictions of the IV bivariate probit, in
all cases, are the opposite. Spending by one candidate tends to increase his
share of the vote among Independent voters and voters of the opposite party,
but decreases the share of the vote from his own party. Therefore whereas
the IV probit implies that campaign spending (by association, advertising)
is targeted at raising votes among members of the candidate’s own party,
the IV bivariate probit implies that spending is targeted at changing the
minds of Independents and members of the opponent’s party.
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In summary, the IV probit over-estimates the effect of Democrat tone,
and can lead to erroneous conclusions about negative campaigning and can-
didate choice. In the case of candidate spending, the effects of campaign
spending on turnout can overturn the IV probit results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we estimated an IV bivariate probit with selection to exam-
ine the effects of negative campaigning by US Senate candidates on voting
outcomes: turnout and the candidate voted for. Our results reflect the im-
portance of accounting for the turnout decision. In particular, we find that:
negative campaigning has a limited mobilizing effects that is confined to the
turnout of Independents but not Democrats and Republican voters. We also
find that the intensity of the campaign matters. (i) As spending increases,
Independent turnout decreases; (ii) intense campaigns tend to focus on win-
ning over Independents. Both findings suggest that there is campaigning
towards the median.
We conclude that negative campaigning is not more effective than pos-
itive campaigning at winning votes. The distinct effects of negative cam-
paigning appears to be confined to stimulating Independents’ turnout. Par-
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tisans who face an unappealing candidate of their own party prefer to stay
home than vote for the opponent’s party. These findings seem to suggest
that when voters stay home, it is more a signal of dissatisfaction with (as
is the case with partisans) or indifference towards (for the Independents)
candidates than with the political system as a whole.
Given that abstention is a rational response from voters rather than a
random occurrence, it follows naturally that the omission of turnout choice
in voters’ selection of candidates can lead to erroneous conclusions.
Our results underscore the strategic aspects of electoral competition in
two ways. Firstly, candidates can (and often do) use electoral strategies to
influence voters’ turnout and candidate choices to win an election. Second,
candidates’ electoral strategies should be understood as a repeated game
between candidates. Understanding the ways in which these strategies work,
and the dynamic nature of candidates’ interactions are fruitful directions of
research.
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Notes
1There is a variety of related definitions of tone in the literature. We follow Lau and
Pomper (2001a)
2We also avoid potential independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives (IIA) issues associated
with logits.
3 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, page 122-3) suggest that this is more informative than
than presenting marginal effects evaluated at the mean.
4The effects of aggregate tone (measured as the fraction of both candidates’ messages
that criticize their opponent) on turnout have been intensively studied under a variety of
settings, with different content analyses of the campaigns. Ansolabehere et al. (1994), An-
solabehere and Iyengar (1995), and Ansolabehere et al. (1999) find evidence for the demo-
bilizing hypothesis (the more negative the campaign, the lower the turnout). Freedman
and Goldstein (1999), Lau and Pomper (2001a), and Goldstein and Freedman (2002)
find evidence for a mobilizing hypothesis, while Finkel and Geer (1998), Wattenberg and
Brians (1999), and Brooks (2006) find evidence for the neutral hypothesis. Kahn and
Kenney (1999) find that the content of the advertising matters: turnout increases when
advertising is informative, while it decreases with mudslinging. Similarly, Freedman and
Lawton (2000) find that turnout decreases only when candidates engage in unfair charges
and responses.
5 Lau et al. (1999) offer a meta-analysis of the literature and find that results are
inconclusive: negative political advertising does not seem to work better than its positive
counterpart. Lau and Pomper (2002) estimate a probit model of voting for the incumbent
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Senator, and find some possible effects of negative advertising on electoral outcomes.
Subsequently, Lau and Pomper (2004) find also that candidate tone does not affect the
choice of Independent voters.
6 Palfrey and Poole (1987) use a conditional logit to model turnout and candidate
choice. Their methodology is similar even though their question is different.
7In this paper we will use the convention that voters are female and candidates are
male.
8 http://www.fec.gov/.
9http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ncdc.html.
10For example, for 1988, the weather measures of November 1 to 10 in each of the years
from 1968 to 1988 are used to obtain the average. In 1990, the years 1970 to 1990 are
used, and so on.
11The next smallest geographical unit available is the congressional district, which we
deem too large. There are 20,000 weather stations in over 3000 counties compared with
435 congressional districts. We were able to successfully match more than 90 percent of
voters in the sample.
12We verified that there were no significant differences in 1988 and 1990 summary
statistics by self-reported turnout and validated turnout. These are available upon request.
13One may argue that maximum temperature may be a better indicator of weather
conditions as it is more likely to observed during the opening of polling stations (see Knack
(1994)). We performed the same analysis using maximum temperature and the diurnal
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temperature range. The results were basically unchanged, with minimum temperature
having the two advantages of being easier to interpret, and having slightly better results.
14Levitt (1994) alternatively instruments campaign spending by focusing on Congres-
sional races where the same two candidates face each other in consecutive races. While
this may be common for House elections, it is an unlikely scenario in Senate elections.
15As with the IV probit, the estimates are identifiable only up to a normalization.
16We are very grateful to Kyoo-il Kim for his generous help in deriving the asymptotic
covariance matrix.
17Many software packages report marginal effects at the mean which measures the effect
on the voter with average characteristics. We have instead opted for the average effect on
all voters which we consider more informative.
18This is also the negative of the marginal effect on having a Republican vote among
nonvoters.
19Estimates of the IV probit are available from the authors upon request.
32
References
Ansolabehere, S. and S. Iyengar (1995). Going Negative : How Political
Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. NEw york: Free Press.
Ansolabehere, S., S. Iyengar, and A. Simon (1999). Replicating experiments
using aggregate and survey data: The case of negative advertising and
turnout. American Political Science Review 93 (4), 901–909.
Ansolabehere, S., S. Iyengar, A. Simon, and N. Valentino (1994). Does
attack advertising demobilize the electorate? American Political Science
Review 88 (4), 829–838.
Boyes, W. J., D. L. Hoffman, and S. A. Low (1989). An econometric analysis
of the bank credit scoring problem. Journal of Econometrics 40, 3–14.
Brooks, D. J. (2006). The resilient voter: Moving toward closure in the
debate over negative campaigning and turnout. The Journal of Poli-
tics 68 (3), 684–696.
Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and
Applications. Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, A., P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes (1960). The
American Voter Unabridged Edition. The University of Chicago Press.
33
Dubin, J. A. and D. Rivers (1989). Selection bias in linear regression. Soci-
ological Methods and Research 18, 360–390.
Finkel, S. E. and J. G. Geer (1998). A spot check: Casting doubt on the
demobilizing effect of attack advertising. American Journal of Political
Science 42 (2), 573–595.
Flanigan, W. H. and N. H. Zingale (1998). Political Behavior of the Amer-
ican Electorate (9 ed.). CQ Press.
Franklin, C. H. (1991). Eschewing obfuscation? campaings and the percep-
tion of U.S. Senate incumbents. American Political Science Review 85,
1193–1214.
Freedman, P. and K. Goldstein (1999, October). Measuring media exposure
and the effects of negative campaign ads. American Journal of Political
Science 43 (4), 1189–1208.
Freedman, P. and L. D. Lawton (2000). Campaign advertising, perceived
fairness, and voter turnout. Prepared for presentation at the 2000 Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, April 27-
30.
Gerber, A. (1998). Estimating the effects of campaign spending on sen-
34
ate election outcomes using instrumental variables. American Political
Science Review 92 (2), 401–411.
Goldstein, K. and P. Freedman (2002, August). Campaign advertising and
voter turnout: New evidence for a stimulation effect. The Journal of
Politics 64 (3), 721–740.
Kahn, K. F. and P. J. Kenney (1999). Do negative campaigns mobilize
or suppress turnout? clarifying the relationship between negativity and
participation. American Political Science Review 93 (4), 877–889.
Knack, S. (1994). Does rain help the republicans? theory and evidence on
turnout and the vote. Public Choice 79 (1–2), 187–209.
Lau, D., L. Sigelman, C. Heldman, and P. Babbitt (1999). The effects of
negative political advertisements: A meta-analytic assessment. American
Political Science Review 93 (4), 851–875.
Lau, R. R. and G. M. Pomper (2001a). Effects of negative campaigning on
turnout in U.S. Senate elections, 1988-1998. The Journal of Politics 63 (3),
804–819.
Lau, R. R. and G. M. Pomper (2001b). Negative campaigning by U.S. Senate
candidates. Party Politics 7 (1), 69–87.
35
Lau, R. R. and G. M. Pomper (2002). Effectiveness of negative campaigning
in U.S. Senate elections. American Journal of Political Science 46 (1), 47–
66.
Lau, R. R. and G. M. Pomper (2004). Negative Campaigning: An Analysis
of U.S. Senate Elections. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Levitt, S. D. (1994, aug). Using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of
campaign spending on election outcomes in the u.s. house. The Journal
of Political Economy 102 (4), 777–798.
Meng, C.-L. and P. Schmidt (1985, February). On the cost of partial ob-
servability in the bivariate probit model. International Economic Re-
view 26 (1), 71–85.
Moore, J. L., J. P. Preimesberger, and D. R. Tarr (2001). Guide to U.S.
Elections (fourth ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Newey, W. K. (1984). A methods of moments interpretation of sequential
estimators. Economics Letters 14, 201–206.
Palfrey, T. R. and K. T. Poole (1987, aug). The relationship between in-
formation, ideology, and voting behavior. American Journal of Political
Science 31 (3), 511–530.
36
Sigelman, L. (1982, feb). The nonvoting voter in voting research. American
Journal of Political Science 26 (1), 47–56.
The American National Election Studies (2005). The 1948-2004 ANES cu-
mulative data file [dataset]. Stanford University and the University of
Michigan [producers and distributors]
Van De Ven, W. P. M. M. and B. M. S. Van Praag (1981). The demand
for deductibles in private health insurance: A probit model with sample
selection. Journal of Econometrics 17, 229–252.
Wattenberg, M. P. and C. L. Brians (1999). Negative campaign advertising:
Demobilizer or mobilizer? American Political Science Review 93 (4), 891–
899.
37
Figure 1: Voter Responses to Shocks.
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Table 1: Voter Demographics and Candidate Characteristics.
mean s.e.
Individual Demographic Characteristics.
vote Dem (voted=1) 0.531 0.499
Voted 0.698 0.459
Age 47 17
Male 0.458 0.498
White 0.784 0.412
Religious 0.390 0.488
Ownhome 0.681 0.466
Married 0.554 0.497
Central 0.279 0.449
Suburb 0.455 0.498
Rural 0.265 0.442
Highsch 0.431 0.495
Somecoll 0.252 0.434
Collmore 0.256 0.437
Party Aﬄiation
Dem3 0.183 0.387
Dem2 0.191 0.393
Dem1 0.129 0.335
Rep1 0.118 0.322
Rep2 0.146 0.353
Rep3 0.137 0.343
Candidate Characteristics
Democrat
# terms incumbent 0.891 1.401
Fall favored candidate 0.181 0.386
Spring favored candidate 0.326 0.470
Total disbursements ($m) 2.637 2.377
Tone 0.348 0.181
Republican
# terms incumbent 0.793 1.369
Fall favored candidate 0.181 0.386
Spring favored candidate 0.280 0.450
Total disbursements ($m) 2.820 3.037
Tone 0.388 0.205
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Table 2: Precipitation, Snow and Minimum Temperature.
Election Day Mean Nov 1 to 10
PRCP SNOW TMIN PRCP SNOW TMIN
year (inch) (inch) (farenheit) (inch) (inch) (farenheit)
1988 3.3 0.4 35.9 9.5 0.3 38.1
(8.0) (2.8) (9.8) (6.1) (0.7) (8.3)
1990 11.4 1.9 32.6 9.6 0.4 37.8
(21.4) (9.0) (10.6) (6.1) (0.8) (8.5)
1992 20.9 1.9 38.5 10.1 0.5 37.2
(34.6) (7.5) (11.1) (6.6) (1.1) (8.7)
1994 1.3 0.2 40.4 9.7 0.4 37.3
(6.2) (2.2) (10.7) (6.3) (0.9) (8.6)
1996 3.9 0.4 36.8 10 0.5 36.2
(11.5) (3.1) (10.0) (6.5) (0.9) (8.5)
1998 12.8 0.6 39.5 10.1 0.5 36.3
(24.4) (3.9) (10.5) (6.3) (1.0) (8.5)
Total 8.9 0.9 37.3 9.8 0.4 37.1
(21.5) (5.4) (10.8) (6.3) (0.9) (8.5)
*Std. err in parentheses.
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Table 8: Marginal Effects: Comparing IV Probit with IV bivariate probit.
IV Bivariate Probit IV Probit
20-pctile Median 80-pctile 20-pctile Median 80-pctile
Democrat
D tone -0.197 -0.010 0.139 -0.092 0.361 0.811
R tone -0.080 0.055 0.189 -0.625 -0.180 0.325
ln(D spend) -0.021 -0.017 -0.010 0.010 0.024 0.033
ln(R spend) 0.010 0.017 0.027 -0.012 -0.008 -0.003
Independent
D tone -0.908 -0.154 0.367 -0.135 0.345 0.753
R tone -0.173 0.007 0.378 0.021 0.190 0.358
ln(D spend) 0.007 0.018 0.031 -0.089 -0.081 -0.058
ln(R spend) -0.054 -0.029 -0.018 0.048 0.067 0.074
Republican
D tone -0.156 0.047 0.313 -0.283 0.151 0.978
R tone -0.119 0.009 0.208 -0.101 -0.067 -0.035
ln(D spend) 0.002 0.014 0.028 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
ln(R spend) -0.026 -0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
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